I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for misreporting interacts with the ex ante incentives for effort. The optimal transfer is option-like, the contract leaves the agent with some ex ante rent and fails to elicit truthful revelation in all states. Audit and transfer co-vary positively, which likely is a forgotten component of many real-life contracts.
Introduction
The standard solution of a moral hazard problem requires the observation of some informative signal of the agent's action. It is then possible to design a second-best contract, which is conditioned on that information instead of the actual action. While convenient to investigate questions such as the cost of moral hazard or explore properties of the solution, this model strongly relies on there being an observable signal of the agent's action. However performance may be difficult to observe or noisy. When the observed signal is not very informative it may be complemented. For example, Dye and Sridhar [10] suggests to gather additional information ex post, and thus to condition the contract on a broader set of data. Sometimes performance is not observed at all: an accounting report, for instance, is not a direct observation of the state of an firm. Rather it is a message that is sent by the same self-interested agent who generated that information in the first place. Then one may construct an audit mechanism (e.g. Kanodia [18] and Mookherjee and Png [26] ). With enough instruments (as in [26] ), the problems of ex ante effort provision and ex post information revelation can be treated separately. More precisely, separability allows ex post truthful revelation without any consequence on the incentive device used to solve the ex ante moral hazard problem.
Their connection becomes moot and the moral hazard problem can be solved in standard fashion. This paper explores exactly that connection. I present a model of moral hazard cum adverse selection, in which the principal cannot disentangle the ex post and the ex ante problems. I show this has significant consequences for the optimal scheme used to solve the moral hazard problem, which is quite different from the standard second-best. In addition, the agent may, optimally and rationally, not truthfully reveal her information, unlike in Mookherjee and Png [26] and Kanodia [18] . Applications of this model are broad-ranging.
For example, after hiring the CEO, a board often asks of him (her) to report his (her) results while on the job; a regulated firm may be asked to reveal its production cost after investing in an uncertain technology.
The starting premise is that the real world does not accord with the results of Mookherjee and Png [26] or Kanodia [18] . Enron executives did not truthfully reveal their information, neither did Merrill Lynch's nor Lehman's.
1 As the Greek economy was imploding it was revealed that its national accounts were not reflective of its true state of affairs. More broadly, Reinhart and Rogoff [28] document that governments facing a sovereign debt crises tend to not disclose the true impact of their actions. Thus a model that systematically predicts truthful revelation has limited applicability. In addition, separability voids any interaction between ex post adverse selection and ex ante moral hazard. The analysis of such interaction has received scant attention in economics, possibly because the Revelation Principle (applied by Mookherjee and Png [26] and others) is too powerful in some sense.
Indeed the accounting literature roots misreporting of information in some failure of the Revelation Principle (e.g. Arya, Glover and Sunder [2] or Demski and Frimor [9] ). I suggest a different route that affirms and exploits the Revelation Principle.
Bar for the issue of observability, the model mirrors that of a standard moral hazard problem. A risk-neutral principal delegates production to a risk-averse agent. The agent's action a governs the distribution F (·|a) of a stochastic outcome θ, which she alone observes.
That information must therefore be elicited ex post. Because the principal otherwise observes nothing, the contract must include an audit and some (exogenous) punishment. The model is not reliant on endogenous penalties nor rewards; that is, the principal possesses fewer instruments than in Kanodia [18] or Mookherjee and Png [26] . Furthermore, the model attempts to be faithful to audit as a sampling process, which is imperfect. 2 This paucity of instruments induces an inability to separate the problems. It introduces a fundamental tension between ex ante effort provision, which requires a state-contingent compensation, and ex post information revelation, which is best addressed with a constant transfer. The equilibrium is fully characterized and its properties are explored.
The audit function, optimal action and transfer schedule are all jointly determined. Three possible information revelation regimes may arise: completely truthful, partially truthful and 1 Kedia and Philippon [20] develop and test a model of earnings management (a euphemism for fraudulent accounting). They document how pervasive the practice is. 2 For example, financial audits are sampling processes.
never truthful. Which of these regimes prevails depends on the whole contract, not just the audit. An ex ante rent must be left to the agent (i.e. the participation constraint is slack) because the penalty for misreporting acts like an implicit limited liability constraint. As in Jewitt, Kadan and Swinkels [17] the transfer function is "option-like" (see Figure 3) , which accords well with many real-life instances. Complete truth-telling can never be an equilibrium because the optimal transfer schedule is constant (optimally at zero) below a performance threshold θ a . Thus for any realisation of the state beneath θ a , the agent has nothing to lose by misreporting. So lack of observability combined with weak punishments require a peculiar contract in response, which in turn prevents complete truth-telling; and lack of truthful revelation induces further distortions. When truthful revelation is possible for at least some states, the agent misreports in the worse states, where the incentive is strongest and the cost is lowest.
Furthermore, the optimal audit and transfer co-vary positively. I suggest that together these two sets of results bring us a step closer to real life. For example with Enron, Merrill
Lynch or Lehman Brothers (to name only a few), bankruptcy might not just have been a case of poor auditing but also (excessively) powerful incentives that can only lead agents to manipulate information. Indeed, the more powerful the ex ante incentives for high effort (i.e. the steeper the transfer function), the more attractive is the option to manipulate information ex post, especially when it is bad. Therefore the more accurate must the audit be.
The papers closest to this one are Kanodia [18] and Mookherjee and Png [26] . Both consider a combination of moral hazard and ex post adverse selection with no observability.
Kanodia [18] renders both information revelation and moral hazard problems vacuous by assuming constant wages (Equation 13). Mookherjee and Png [26] combine a Grossman-
Hart [12] model with an ex post revelation mechanism, where the principal may be a tax authority. The agent's message conditions a payment to the principal and the probability of a perfect audit. In equilibrium the principal offers rewards (not fines, by limited liability) for truthful revelation; these may be arbitrarily large. 3 These are enough instruments to elicit truth-telling without any bearing on the contract used to solve the moral hazard problem; their connection vanishes. Close to Mookherjee and Png [26] , Border and Sobel [4] construct an audit mechanism with endogenous penalties as well. The optimal probability of audit is varying in the messages sent; truthful revelation obtains. In a similar vein, Reinganum
and Wilde [27] show that a simple audit cut-off rule does at least as well as a random audit rule. Both [4, 27] ignore the agent's participation decision, as pointed out by Mookherjee and
Png [26] . 4 In all these papers, auditing is perfect but the principal controls the probability of running an audit. I depart from them in two ways. First, there are no endogenous penalties for misreporting nor rewards for truthful revelation; the principal thus must do with fewer instruments. Second, the audit is imperfect. That technology is closer to one of sampling, which is what most real audits do, and has been modeled by Bushman and Kanodia [5] or Demski and Dye [8] .
Others combine moral hazard and adverse selection, however not with soft information.
Gromb and Martimort [11] let (an) expert(s) search for some information by exerting some effort, who then has (have) to disclose it to the principal. The expert(s) receive(s) a soft signal, but whether a project is eventually successful is publicly observable. To overcome the moral hazard problem, the expert's incentive contract must be made state-dependent.
Like in this paper, this very fact introduces adverse selection. However, a contract can be conditioned on the final outcome, unlike here. For the purpose of this discussion, Krähmer and Strausz [22] adopt a similar construct in the context of pre-project planning. Malcolmson [25] studies a problem where, as in Gromb and Martimort [11] , the agent acquires soft information and the return to the principal is publicly observable. That soft information 3 Mookherjee and Png's model yields a quirky byproduct: the agent strictly prefers being audited. This owes to the construction of the revelation constraint (2), which implicitly only allows reward to be offered for truth-telling. 4 In Khalil [21] truthful revelation can be obtained through a standard direct revelation mechanism.
Auditing relaxes the agent's incentive constraint; the principal trades-off the audit cost with the information rent.
may be used by the agent to make a decision yielding the verifiable outcome. The principal may have incentives to distort the decision rule away from the first-best to foster information acquisition. In all these papers, information is exogenously given although ex ante unknown to the agent. Here the private information emerges endogenously. Levitt and Snyder [24] develop a contracting model in which the agent receives an early (soft) signal about the likely success of the project, however the eventual outcome is fully observed by the principal, hence contractible. With appropriate early information, the principal can decide whether to shutdown or continue. To obtain this information, the principal must commit to shut-down less frequently than the unconstrained solution prescribes.
After introducing the model, Section 3 deals with the ex post information revelation problem. Next I characterize the optimal contract; Sections 5 explores some properties.
Section 6 offers a discussion of modeling choices (penalties, participation fees, commitment, audit). The proofs and some of the technical material are relegated to the Appendix.
Model
A principal delegates a task to an agent. She undertakes an action a ∈ A, which is a compact subset of R + . The action's cost c(a) is increasing and convex, and yields a stochastic 
, so that auditing remains imperfect. If discovered the agent receives nothing.
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With this construction the expected utility function of an agent at the revelation stage is
is a sorting condition on the ex post expected utility of the agent, akin to the Spence-Mirrlees condition. Further discussion of the properties of p(·; α) is postponed to the next section.
The timing is almost standard: That payoffs are realized needs not imply that they are observed by the principal, as in the accounting example. Alternatively one can interpret this as the agent being gone by then, so that the ex post information embedded in the principal's payoff cannot be used.
Degrees of Information Revelation
I start by showing that truthful revelation in any arbitrary state θ amounts to a condition relating the transfer function t(·) to the probability p(·|α). This defines three regimes:
complete, partial or no information revelation. To do so I exploit two results contained in a companion paper (Roger [29] ); (i) a direct mechanism where Ω = Θ induces a measure of pooling, which is bad for incentives and (ii) there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to a simple separating mechanism, in which Ω = M and Θ ⊂ M ⊂ R.
Fix the contract ⟨t, p⟩ and consider the agent's problem after the action a has been sunk.
She sends a message m such that max m∈ M v(t( m)) [1 − p( m − θ)]. Her best reply m(θ)
solves:
} -this is the set of optimal messages. For a mechanism to be truthful,
, that is, truth-telling corresponds to a maximum:
at some θ. Because the solution to (3.1) is unique, (3.2) is sufficient at θ for truthful revelation. Given that t ′ ≥ 0 ∀ m, and strictly for at least some m, is necessary to induce a non-trivial action, this equation can hold only if p ′ (0; α) ≥ 0 (and strictly for at least some values). Define P as the set of audit technologies satisfying this minimum condition. Equation (3.2) embodies a requirement on the precision of the audit at 0; that is, it defines a subset P 0 (t) ⊆ P of audit functions that can elicit truthful revelation for at least some values of θ, given the transfer t. That Condition (3.2) holds at some θ does not mean it does
for all values. There may be three cases of interest.
Case 1: Truthful revelation. This occurs when Condition (3.2) is satisfied for all values
of the private information θ; more precisely, ∀θ,
That is, jointly with the transfer, the audit technology p(·; α) is sufficiently precise to induce truthful revelation:
Case 2: Partial truthful revelation. This corresponds to condition v
and truthtelling obtains aboveθ (so
truthtelling is out of reach belowθ (where m(θ) > θ). The converse is true for v(t(·))
convex. 
. This is shown on the right panel of Figure 1 .
In Cases 2 and 3 an agent who is induced to exert any effort necessarily misreports her private information with positive probability. This owes to the fundamental tension between ex ante effort incentives, which require a state-contingent transfer schedule, and ex post information revelation that is best addressed with state-independent transfers. This rich array of outcomes obtains because (i) the audit technology is allowed to be imperfect, unlike much of the audit literature; and (ii) the principal possesses limited instruments.
One last remark is in order. There may exist many kinds of contracts satisfying t ′ ≥ 0:
some may include jumps, there may be intervals on which t ′ = 0 and so on, with implications Figure 1 . To see why, consider a transfer scheme t(·) that is flat on some range, say, on
. Ifθ ≥ θ 2 the agent misreports her information on Θ f as anywhere else belowθ.
Ifθ ≤ θ 1 , she may face the conditions
i.e. t(·) may be steeper at θ 2 than at θ 1 and (3.2) is reversed. Then one moves from truthful revelation aboveθ and below θ 1 to misreporting from θ 2 on, i.e. there is a jump in the
This is shown on Figure 2 , where the left panel is the transfer offered and the right one the agent's optimal message.
Characterising the contract
To proceed, I first seek to understand the behaviour of the contract for some fixed audit technology p(·; α). Then I endogenize α, to which all other endogenous variables also respond, and optimize fully over the whole set of instruments t, a, α. I use the first-order approach. The ensuing analysis may be problematic in that the agent's utility
may not be smooth, nor even continuous, atθ. It turns out that it must be both (see Lemma 5 in the Appendix). From this it follows that the optimal message is also a smooth function of θ atθ by the Theorem of the Maximum (see Figure 1 ), so the regime change at θ is "smooth" and the first-order approach can safely be applied. The other potential source of discomfort is that highlighted in Figure 2 , i.e. a jump away from truth-telling aboveθ;
this is addressed later. Defining t over M, i.e. t : M → R, the principal's program is
whereθ ≡θ(p(·; α), t, a). The ex post message may be entirely truthful (only drawn from Θ), not at all (and only drawn from M) or some of both depending on whereθ lies. 10 From an ex ante standpoint the principal must account for any of these possibilities, which the objective function and the constraints reflect. Condition (4.1) is the agent's information revelation constraint -the novelty in this paper. Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier of the moral hazard constraint (4.3) and µ that of the participation constraint (4.2).
Form of the contract
In this model the ex post problem interacts with the provision of ex ante incentives. This affects the form of the contract in possibly several ways. First, the ability to inflate one's performance may alter the expected cost to the principal, as well as a the choice of action by the agent. The principal responds by distorting the transfer schedule, as shown below.
Lemma 1 Fix a and α. The first-order conditions of Problem 1 are given by:-
for θ <θ; and 10 More comprehensively the program allows for jumps as described in Section 3; the principal's objective is then max α,t,a ∫θ
, with a jump at θ 2 and two thresholdsθ,θ-and the agent's utility is similarly modified. The analysis extends immediately. Note that although the problem does not specify a distribution over the message space M, F (θ|a) is still the relevant distribution because m(θ) is injective. For details, see Roger [29] .
When the agent can report m(θ) > θ, she is being paid "too much" given a, which the principal anticipates.
The second issue speaks to the nature of the constraints of Problem 1. In the standard problem the principal presents the agent with a transfer function of the form
for some action a S , and where µ S , λ S are both strictly positive (see [16] ). Two observations must be made. Firstly, it is immediate from ( I draw on the work of Jewitt, Kadan and Swinkel [17] , who consider exogenous bounds on payments, to characterize the transfer function. Because the ratio f a /f is monotonic and 
where κ ≥ 0, κ ̸ = µ and m(θ) solves (4.1).
The next result furthers the characterization of the optimal transfer schedule.
Lemma 2 The multiplier λ of the moral hazard constraint (4.3) is strictly positive.
Therefore the optimal transfer function t O (·) is fully described by Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, and it behaves according to the ratio f a /f . Next I complete the description of the transfer schedule.
Proposition 2 The optimal transfer function t O solving Problem 1 is continuous and nondecreasing over Θ; in particular, it is:-
• continuous but with a kink at θ a ;
• non-decreasing concave for all θ above θ a ; and
• continuous and differentiable atθ.
The second part of Proposition 2 is trivially true whenθ = θ orθ = θ, for then either (4.4) or (4.5) prevails over the whole range Θ. Whenθ is interior, t O is still continuous atθ.
The reason is that m(θ) smoothly converges to θ atθ because the function U is smooth.
(See the left panel of Figure 1 ). Proving the first part is simple; to understand it, recall the informational value of the ratio f a /f at θ a . This is the point where F a is the most negative, that is, where effort has the highest marginal effect. Thus a signal θ a is indicative of an effort level that is the most valuable for the principal, who offers the agent the steepest incentives at that point (the transfer t is concave, increasing from θ a on). This feature of the contract accords well with practice, where boni may be observed when a hurdle is passed.
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Corollary 1 The optimal message m(θ) is everywhere continuous on Θ; i.e. there are no jumps.
This follows from the fact that the optimal transfer function t O is monotone concave from θ a on. There can be no pair
be simultaneously holding at θ 1 but reversed at θ 2 . Consequently the conditions outlined by
Jewitt [16] are also sufficient here. Furthermore, there can be only at most one thresholdθ, and the three simple regimes described in Section 3 are exhaustive.
Optimal contract
As part of the optimal contract the principal selects his audit technology p(·; α) ∈ P by choice of α. This may have two effects. First, fixing t(·) and a, it may alter the degree of information revelation, i.e. the cutoffθ (Cases 1 to 3). Second, t(·) and a are endogenous variables, so they too adjust to a change in α. The optimal contract balances all these effects.
Proposition 3
The optimal contract is characterised by:-
a continuous transfer scheme t
O =    t O (m(θ)), θ <θ; t O (θ), θ ≥θ.
determined by Proposition 1, and Conditions (4.4) and (4.5) on the relevant ranges; 2. an action a O solving the first-order condition ∫θ
θ [x − t(m(x))(1 − p)]dF a + ∫ θ θ [x − t(x)]dF a +λ [ ∫θ θ v(t(m(x)))(1 − p)dF aa + ∫ θ θ v(t(x))dF aa − c ′′ (a) ] = 0 (4.7)
and an audit investment α
The thresholdθ is free to lie at either boundary or to be interior; it is endogenous to the contract and so is the regime one operates under. The first two items of Proposition 3 resem- , and this entails a trade-off given by (4.9); that is, further distortions arise. The total marginal benefit (LHS) includes saving on undue transfers, as well as tightening of the moral hazard constraint, which is discussed later. When truthful revelation is impossible, the transfer is determined solely by (4.4) and (4.7) is modified by extendingθ to θ. Importantly, truth-telling cannot be guaranteed Figure 3 shows the optimal transfer scheme.
The optimal transfer function is so different from the standard one that it is difficult to perform cross-model comparisons and comment on the level of transfers and the level of the action a O . Indeed, consider this: from Proposition 3 it may be tempting to assert that when
, truth-telling obtains and no distortion ensues, as in Mookherjee and Png [26] . But Proposition 1 still applies; so it is really the property of separability, rather than the outcome of truthful revelation, that is key. 
Suppose however that t O were fixed and exactly as the standard transfer t S on the portion above θ a . Then rewriting the agent's moral hazard constraint (4.3) as 
Equilibrium properties of the optimal contract
Now that a solution to Problem 1 has been derived, I explore some of its characteristics. It is already known that the optimal contract features ex ante rents, but I have remained silent as to the fixed component below θ a . This is important because it directly affects the cost of the contract as well as the agent's ex ante incentives for effort and her ex post incentives to reveal information.
Proposition 4 The optimal transfer t O pays zero below θ a .
This is a fairly intuitive result. Anything below zero is not binding, as argued before.
Anything above zero is too costly for two reasons. One, it induces a lower action from the agent because it insures her against failure. Two, it does not improve on information revelation (the thresholdθ). To see why, takeθ interior and start from t O = 0 below θ a (in this case θ a <θ necessarily by (3.2) ). Decreasing the threshold fromθ to the next type down, sayθ costs some γ > 0 to be offered for all states. But that change fromθ toθ has zero measure. A consequence of Proposition 5 is that:
Corollary 2 Completely truthful revelation (Case 1) can never occur in equilibrium.
Given the penalties specified, the optimal contract that offers the agent some incentives to exert costly effort cannot simultaneously induce her to be completely truthful. Furthermore, because the optimal transfer function is concave, misreporting always occurs "at the bottom" (see Case 2) . Indeed, the agent whose private information is the worst is the one with the strongest incentives to misreport when facing a concave transfer, and also with the lowest cost of misreporting.
The relationship between audit and transfers
From the agent's best response (4.3) one readily sees that a better audit (higher α) decreases effort. 12 Thus audit and transfer could be construed as strategic substitutes, since a higher action is associated (at least weakly) with a higher transfer. However they move in the same direction.
Proposition 5 Transfer t O and audit investment α O co-vary positively.
Optimally, high-power contracts are necessarily accompanied with a large enough investment in the audit technology. Conversely, it is because the audit is sufficiently precise that the 12 Fix t and let a * solve the agent's first-order condition (4.3) and differentiate with respect to α, da * dα ≡ da * dp dp dα < 0.
contract is high-powered. Increasing t in isolation in response the the moral hazard problem is destructive; it requires a simultaneous increase in audit. This claim may be slightly counterintuitive but may be explained as follows. As α increases, the agent's choice a * decreases because the ability to misreport enhances the marginal benefit of a high action, but the audit curtails that. So the principal's expected cost of a given action decreases and in response he increases the transfer (in each state). This is what leads to a tightening of the moral hazard problem in (4.9).
From a practical standpoint, Proposition 5 together with Condition (3.2) suggest it may not be the lack of audit that is the culprit in high-profile scandals such as Enron or Lehman
Brothers. There is little doubt that firms of that nature are subject to audit. Rather the audit may not have been sufficient given the incentives offered. It is well documented that Enron executives engaged in information manipulation in spite of being audited. I am willing to add it was because the incentives were so powerful. 
Discussion
Other penalties
The paper purposefully departs from optimal penalties because these necessarily lead truthful revelation (unless they conflict with a limited liability constraint, which is essentially equivalent to the present model). Here I discuss two potential modifications to the model in this respect.
Harsher penalties
The model could allow for penalties −l < 0. Then the first-order condition (3.1) would
and clearly (i) there would be less exaggeration in equilibrium and (ii) for some l large enough, m(θ) = θ ∀θ (no misreporting).
In the latter case, one would revert to model closer to that of Mookherjee and Png [26] . 13 If l
were not large enough, the problem would remain as here, albeit muted. The only significant difference is that the threshold θ a would be such that f a /f would be negative.
Penalties conditioned on offense
The Maximal Punishment Principle (see Baron and Besanko [3] , now MPP) asserts that the penalty should be as severe as possible, and thus swiftly rules out conditioning it on the offense (e.g. small deviations from the state θ could be met with fines that commensurate).
Setting the MPP aside, suppose that the principal instead uses some fine φ ≡ φ( m−θ) where
and one can see that the truth-telling condition (3.2) turns into
In other words, driving a wedge between the transfers when the agent reports truthfully and does not, is essential. That is, φ(·) must be discontinuous at 0. How large a 13 Noting that here truthful revelation would obtain immediately from the exogenous penalty.
wedge (discontinuity) is discussed above at some length. The MPP applies in this model as in many others because the audit generates no false negatives.
Audit: modeling choice
According to most accounting standards (e.g. US GAAP or the AASB in Australia), an audit seeks to provide a reasonable assurance that statements are free from material errors.
As a result, a sampling procedure is usually adopted by financial auditors, who can verify the details of the transaction(s). 14 Statistical sampling is also followed by ISO-accredited companies for the purpose of quality assurance. 15 But in either case, the audit is always performed. The technology p(·; α) I have chosen displays exactly these two characteristics.
Furthermore, absent additional (possibly unbounded, as in Mookherjee and Png [26] ) punishments or rewards, the construction of Border and Sobel [4] or Mookherjee and
Png [26] cannot deliver separation, let alone truthful revelation. To see why, observe that the audit technology can be rewritten p(ω; α) and interpreted as a probability of running the audit, given some message ω -as in those papers. Then truth-telling requires 
Participation fee and binding constraint
The agent receives an ex ante rent in this model; the participation constraint fails to bind. This could be addressed with an ex ante participation fee, say ϕ. Then a contract entails a tariff T = (t(·), ϕ) and the agent's expected utility reads U = (1 − 
for each t, so for a fixed transfer function the truth-telling condition holds for a larger set of states θ. That is, −ϕ acts like −l (see the first paragraph of this discussion). When ϕ is not too large, the information revelation problem remains as in the main text.
The main purpose of the fee ϕ is to render the participation constraint binding; suppose such a fee does exist. When µ > 0 however the optimal transfer function still retains the same shape. The reason is that ϕ is paid ex ante, so ex post the agent still faces a gamble
{p, 1 − p} over utilities {v(−ϕ), v(t(m) − ϕ)} versus taking some really bad v(t(θ) − ϕ).
If the participation constraint is made to bind the agent no longer receives an ex ante rent
that is decreasing in the state θ.
Commitment
Commitment to the contract is an assumption that is both standard and very strong, even more so in this model where the principal commits himself to accept a(n) (obvious) lie (above θ) and to still compensate the agent according to her message. Implicit in this model is an extension of this commitment to any external auditor the principal may hire. To implement this, the principal may simply not inform the auditor about the support Θ. Otherwise one reverts to the limitation of direct mechanisms (see Roger [29] ).
Commitment to running the audit is immaterial because the marginal cost of audit is naught. If for some reason the principal is unable to commit (to the audit, specifically), the game becomes one of cheap talkà la Crawford and Sobel [7] at the stage of information revelation. Ignoring the possibility of babbling equilibrium, auditing becomes no longer essential but may assist in improving information.
When a principal cannot observe the outcome of his agent's action in a moral hazard framework and needs to elicit this information from that very agent, he faces a problem of ex post adverse selection as well. With limited instruments, this introduces a fundamental tension between ex ante incentive, for which a contingent transfer is necessary, and ex post incentives, best addressed with a state-independent transfer. Type separation (not necessarily truthful revelation) requires the use of an ex post audit and penalties.
The ex post adverse selection problem is costly to the principal in three ways: first, the agent is able to exaggerate her actual performance and thereby may receive an inflated transfer. The principal's response introduces a first set of distortions. Second, because penalties are weak, they act as an implicit limited liability constraint. As a result the participation constraint cannot bind (there are rents) and the contract resembles an option.
Last, the very fact that the contract entails a region with constant transfer implies that complete truthful revelation can never arise in equilibrium. There may be partial truthful revelation below a threshold; that is, the agent misreports her information in the worse states because the incentive is the strongest and the cost the lowest.
A key result of this paper is that the audit investment and the level of transfer co-vary.
That is, the stronger the incentives offered to the agent, the more she must be audited to be kept in check. If thinking of real-life events (bankruptcies) of the past decade, it seems that this relationship may have been forgotten at times.
Appendix: Proofs
Preliminaries
I begin with a series of Lemmata that address the potential lack of smoothness of the agent's expected utility function U , and others that the will be useful throughout.
Lemma 3
The function U is a.e. differentiable over Θ. differentiable, by application of the Theorem of Lebesgue, except at most for a finite set of points. Differentiate (3.1) with respect to θ and rearrange.
In spite of Lemma 3, there may still exist problematic discontinuities, especially atθ, and this point is one of particular interest.
Lemma 5 The function U is continuous and differentiable atθ whenθ ∈ (θ, θ)
Proof: I show that U cannot be discontinuous atθ and that by Condition (3.2) it must be also differentiable. The proof is written for U concave but also applies with obvious adjustments when it is convex. Suppose v(t(·)) is at least weakly concave; since only upward deviations are of concern, the trouble is that we may have
Suppose so, then truth-telling cannot be an optimal response atθ. So there must exist some value θ 0 <θ (possibly θ) such that v(t(θ)) ≥
Let θ →θ, this is exactly the definition of continuity. Now notice that
2) is a pasting condition atθ. 
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
The existence, sufficiency and uniqueness of such contract is shown in Jewitt, Kadan and Swinkels [17] (in particular, they show the multipliers µ, λ exist and are non-negative). To construct the contract, fix some action a O and take the first-order condition. We know µ = 0 necessarily, so below θ a the transfer must be such that 1/v ′ remains non-negative.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Fix some a. Integrate 1/v ′ over Θ:
where κ ≥ 0. That is,
(unless v ′ = ∞ for some t and that t is a constant 
Therefore the agent also reveals herself truthfully at θ 2 ; she does not jump away from truthtelling. 
Proof of Proposition
Proof of Proposition 4:
Any amount lower than zero is not binding. 
